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(WHEN) DOES A CONTRACT CLAIM TRUMP A
TAKINGS CLAIM? LESSONS FROM THE WATER
WARS
David W. Spohr*
Abstract: As in other river basins, the disparity in the Columbia is growing
between ever-expanding water demands and ever-shrinking water availability.
Looming near the forefront of decisions on how to manage such waters is the
potential liability the government faces if it reduces water distributions to
further environmental objectives. While recent cases raise fascinating takings
and contract issues, the most interesting issue may be the intersection of the
available remedies. Does the contractual relationship between an aggrieved
water user and the government preclude a takings claim, even where the
contract claim ultimately fails? On one end of the spectrum, courts have held
that a takings claim is available even if the contract terms expressly allowed the
governmental action alleged to be the taking. Conversely, courts have held that
a contract completely subsumes any takings claim even if the government
breached the contract but escaped contract liability. This article suggests a
middle ground: the availability of a takings claim should depend on why the
contract claim failed.
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INTRODUCTION

Federal decisions apportioning water between the competing
demands of private water users and environmental interests
have been at the epicenter of the recent water wars. In a trio of
major cases moving through the trial and appellate courts,
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, Stockton
East Water District v. United States and Klamath Irrigation
District v. United States (together, “the water trio”), the federal
government reduced water distribution in response to
environmental concerns and water users sued for breach of
contract and inverse condemnation (takings).1 The resolution
of these cases may dramatically impact future water
management decisions.
These cases raise a myriad of fascinating takings issues.
Can the government successfully assert a backgroundlimitation defense regarding claimants’ asserted property
interests, such as an inherent limitation in water rights,2
1. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 746 (2006), 76 Fed. Cl. 100
(2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en
banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009), on remand 102 Fed. Cl. 443 (2011)
(collectively “Casitas”); Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 321
(2007), modified in part, 76 Fed. Cl. 497 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in
part, 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009), on reh’g in part, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(collectively “Stockton East”); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl.
504 (2005), 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007), questions certified, 532 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
questions accepted, 202 P.3d 159 (Ore. 2009), questions answered, 227 P.3d 1145 (Ore.
2010), trial court judgment vacated and remanded, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(collectively “Klamath”).
2. Compare Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check:
Property Rights, Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western Water
Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1097, 1099 (2009) (arguing that water rights
are genuine property rights to the flow of water, and as such, compensation must be
provided for any state exercise of eminent domain) with Brian Gray, Takings and
Water Rights, 48 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 23-1, 23-7, 23-44 (2002) (noting that water
rights may be limited by the common nature of the resource, hydrologic uncertainty,
variability and priority, tensions between privatization and state ownership and other
express limitations on property rights in water, and that certain states “have conferred
only a conditional and fragile property right in water”). See also Kobobel v. State Dept.
of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 2011) (“one’s property right in water [is]
uncertain in nature”).
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application of the “public trust doctrine,”3 or some type of
beneficial use/reasonable use/nuisance defense?4 Will a court
apply the government-friendly regulatory takings analysis,5
the plaintiff-friendly physical takings analysis6 or the more
neutral exactions analysis?7 Do the mechanics of how the
water is restricted or diverted affect which standard the court
will apply?8
These takings questions, however, are only important where

3. Compare National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 445–47
(1976) (California’s public trust doctrine “prevents any party from acquiring a vested
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public
trust”) with Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d
232, 239–40 (Wash. 1993) (Washington’s public trust doctrine is limited to “the public’s
right of access” and does not “extend to non-navigable waters or groundwater”).
Compare also IDAHO CODE § 58-1203(2)(b) (1996) (expressly excluding water rights
from the public trust doctrine’s reach, overruling Idaho Cons. League, Inc. v. State, 911
P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995)) with San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel.
County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) (declaring legislative attempt to
expressly exclude public trust values from water right adjudications unconstitutional).
4. Compare People ex. rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743
(1976) (the definition of reasonable and beneficial may evolve as circumstances change
over time) with Shepard, supra note 2, at 1100 (if states can redefine beneficial use
they can essentially “reclaim water rights merely by redefining them out of existence”).
See also State Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash.2d 459, 471–72, 852 P.2d 1044,
1051–52 (Wash. 1993) (discussing beneficial use); Douglas Grant, ESA Reductions in
Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking of Property?, 36
ENVTL. L. 1331, 1376 (2006) (no western court has ruled on “whether the noncallous
exercise of a water right would be a nuisance if it harms fish”).
5. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(regulatory takings analysis looks at the regulation’s economic impact on the claimant,
its interference with claimant’s investment-backed expectations and its character).
6. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982)
(permanent physical occupation is a taking regardless of public benefit or minimal
economic impact).
7. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 390–91 (1994) (government must show
an “essential nexus” between the state interest and the required dedication and must
make an “individualized determination” that the required dedication is roughly
proportional to the proposed development’s impact).
8. As discussed below, Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543 F.3d
1276, 1295–96 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reversed the trial court’s selection of a regulatory
takings analysis, but the panel based its opinion on the mechanics of the restriction,
which required Casitas to physically divert water to a fish ladder. The panel left open
whether the choice of takings analysis would be different if the government had simply
required Casitas to leave water in the stream. Id. at 1295 & n.16. See also Estate of
Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211–12 (2008) (government fencing preventing
cattle from accessing water caused a physical taking of certain water rights while
government restricting plaintiff’s ability to clear and maintain channels and ditches,
which the court found resulted in plaintiff losing water, created a regulatory taking of
other water rights).
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the claimant makes it to the takings starting gate. This article
considers the threshold question of whether the existence of a
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the
government (as exists in the water trio) makes a case purely a
contract dispute and eliminates any takings claim. The
opinions agree on deferring the takings claim until after the
contract claim has been decided and that a plaintiff prevailing
on a contract claim cannot recover for that same loss under a
takings theory.9 But courts diverge significantly regarding
whether a plaintiff who loses on a contract claim may proceed
with a takings claim for the same government action.10
To provide a framework for resolving that discrepancy, Part
II.A begins with a brief background for, and then analysis of,
the water trio. Part II.B describes the two very distinct ways a
government can successfully defend against a contract claim.
The first is a reflection of normal contract law, applying the
same rules that govern private party contracts. The second is a
“government-only” affirmative defense known as the
“sovereign acts doctrine,” which provides that if the
government undertakes a genuinely public and general act
only incidentally falling upon the contract, and if that act
makes the government’s performance of the contract
impossible, the government can escape contract liability even
where a private party could not.11 Part II.B.1 examines the
“public and general” component of the doctrine through the
lens of the water trio, while Part II.B.2 does the same for
impossibility.
With this foundation, Part III first explains how the water
trio has answered divergently the question of whether a
plaintiff losing on a contract claim may proceed with a takings
claim. This section then offers a solution: when the contract
claim fails, whether or not a plaintiff may bring a takings
claim should turn on why the contract claim fails. Part III.A
expounds on why, if the right at issue was created by contract,
9. See, e.g., Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1368–69
(Fed. Cir. 2009), on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy,
Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Henry Housing Ltd. v.
United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 250, 256 (2010).
10. Compare Stockton East, 583 F.3d at 1369 (where contract claim fails on merits,
plaintiff can pursue taking claim) with St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511
F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (where contract claim fails on merits, plaintiff cannot
pursue takings claim).
11. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 521 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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and a court determines that the government did not actually
breach the contract, no takings claim should follow where: (1)
plaintiffs have retained the remedies any contracting party
has; (2) the government was acting in its proprietary capacity
and can only cause a taking in its sovereign capacity;12 (3) the
contract terms are an inherent limitation in plaintiffs’ property
interests; (4) basic symmetry requires this outcome; and (5) the
alternative outcome would violate the teaching that the
Takings Clause has “limited applicability” to contracts with
the government. Part III.B describes how the five rationales
reverse in a plaintiff’s favor where the government breaches
the contract but is able to successfully assert a “sovereign acts”
defense. In such a scenario, this article argues, a plaintiff
should be allowed to assert a takings claim. Finally, III.C
provides a summation and then explains the feature of the
water cases (the complex assortment of underlying contract
and other property interests) that complicates application of
the above principles.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Fifth Amendment Water Rights Cases

While the current trio of water takings cases looks to an
earlier triad of Supreme Court opinions issued from 1931 to
1963, none of those earlier cases involved potentially-abridged
contract rights. In International Paper Company v. United
States, the government had no existing contractual
relationship with either the power company that provided
water for electrical output, nor with the paper company who
had lost the use of water it had been receiving from the power
company’s diversion.13 In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Company, the government diverted water in favor of contract
water rights holders. The plaintiffs were riparian grassland
owners who had historically survived on natural spring peak
12. As opposed to the government’s more typical “sovereign” or regulatory capacity,
the government acts in a “proprietary” or commercial capacity when it “steps off the
throne” and engages in transactions “individuals and corporations engage in among
themselves.” Stovall v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 696, 698 (2006) (quoting Kania v.
United States, 650 F.2d 264, 268–69 (Fed. Cir. 1981)).
13. Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405 (1931). There was a
contractual relationship in play, but that between the power company and the paper
company. Id. at 404–05, 407.
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flows—flows the government ended to provide for contract
holders.14 Similarly, in Dugan v. Rank, the government again
benefitted contract water rights holders at the expense of
downstream owners cut off by the government action.15
A more closely analogous case to the three presently being
litigated is Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United
States, in which plaintiff claimed that the federal government’s
Endangered Species Act-based restrictions constituted a
taking of their contractually-conferred rights to use project
water.16 Rejecting the government’s argument that it had
merely frustrated, rather than appropriated, plaintiffs’ rights
in water, the trial court determined that the government had
“essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract
rights,” causing a “complete occupation” and a physical
taking.17 But the court analyzed the contract—one with the
state, not the federal government—only to determine the scope
of the plaintiff’s water right vis-à-vis the takings claim.18
Plaintiffs did not allege that the government breached any
federal contract and the government did not raise a defense
that the plaintiff-federal contractual relationship trumped the
takings claim.19
Tulare and the current trio share much of the same basic
fact pattern. The federal government enters into contracts with
local interests to construct and operate a large water project.
Later, concerns over the harm these projects cause to fish boils
over. An environmental agency, the National Marine Fisheries
Service or the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, issues a
biological opinion that protects fish by restricting the amount
of water the agency administering the project, the Bureau of
Reclamation (Reclamation), may make available to users.20
14. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 730 (1950).
15. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621 (1963). The irrigation districts were, in fact,
originally defendants. Id. at 615.
16. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314
(2001).
17. Id. at 319.
18. Id. at 320–21.
19. Tulare involved contracts between private parties and both the state and the
Reclamation, but the court discussed only the state contract in its takings analysis. Id.
at 315, 321.
20. Stockton East did not involve a biological opinion, though the environmental
agency may have “dictated” how much water Reclamation could release. Stockton East
Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1356, 1367 & n.39 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Water user interests then sue the federal government in the
United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging both contract
and takings claims. A thumbnail sketch of the pertinent trial
and appellate decisions in Casitas, Stockton East, and Klamath
(in the order the Federal Circuit eventually weighed in)
follows. Details of how each court handled the relevant issues
of whether the government breached the terms of the contract
or successfully asserted a sovereign acts defense, as well as the
intersection of the contract and takings claims, are reserved
for later discussion.
In Casitas, the parties developed plans for a fish passage
structure in response to an environmental group’s threatened
suit based on Endangered Species Act (ESA) violations.21 The
subsequent biological opinion concluded the passage structure
would avoid species jeopardy.22 Plaintiffs constructed the fish
passage structure and ran water through it, then filed takings
and breach of contract claims.23 Casitas I addressed the
contract claims, concluding that the sovereign acts doctrine
provided a valid defense for any water loss.24 Casitas II
addressed the takings claims and determined that intervening
Supreme Court doctrine compelled application of a regulatory,
not physical, takings analysis to the water loss.25 Because
plaintiffs had earlier admitted they could not succeed under a
regulatory taking analysis, the court granted defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment.26 Plaintiffs appealed.27
21. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas I), 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 748–49
(2006).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 752, 755. The court does not seem to have reached a decision on whether
the water diversion actually breached the terms of the contract. Id. at 752–53
(discussing, but apparently not resolving, the issue before turning to the sovereign acts
doctrine). In addition to the water loss, Plaintiffs brought another contract claim
related to whether the cost of constructing the fish ladder itself should have, per the
terms of the contract, been borne by plaintiffs or the government. Id. at 748, 750–52.
The trial court determined that such costs were properly chargeable to plaintiffs, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed on this point. Id. at 752, aff’d in relevant part, 543 F.3d
1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2009). Because plaintiffs never claimed that the imposition of the fish ladder costs
worked a taking, see Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas II), 76 Fed.
Cl. 100, 104–06 (2007), the fish ladder cost issue will not be discussed further in this
article.
25. Casitas II, 76 Fed. Cl. at 106 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Council, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
26. Id. at 104, 106.
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In Casitas III, the Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract
claim.28 The panel concluded that the water diversions did
breach the terms of the contract, but that the sovereign acts
doctrine provided a defense.29 The panel reversed on the
takings claim, finding that the government “did not merely
require some water to remain in stream, but instead actively
caused the physical diversion of water away from the
[project].”30 The court held that a physical takings analysis was
applicable.31 The panel and en banc Circuit denied rehearing.32
Finally, on remand, the trial court found that certain
background principles of state law (such as beneficial use)
imposed limitations on plaintiff’s water right, but balanced and
rejected the government’s nuisance, reasonable use, public
trust doctrine, and state statutory defenses.33 The court
determined the government had not yet actually encroached on
plaintiff’s beneficial use or reduced their actual water
deliveries.34 The court dismissed plaintiff’s takings claim as
unripe.35
In Stockton East Water District v. United States,
Reclamation completed construction of the project and signed
contracts that specified maximum and minimum acre-feet
Reclamation would make available.36 The state had mandated
certain annual releases for fishery and wildlife, but Congress
later raised the required fish/wildlife/habitat water releases.37
Accordingly, Reclamation began restricting releases to water
users.38 Plaintiffs thereafter brought takings and breach of
contract claims.39 In Stockton East I, the trial court ruled that
27. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas III), 543 F.3d 1276, 1283
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
28. Id. at 1283–88.
29. Id. at 1288.
30. Id. at 1291.
31. Id. at 1294.
32. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
33. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 454–65 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
34. Id. at 471.
35. Id. at 478.
36. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1349–51 (Fed. Cir.
2009), on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
37. Id. at 1351–52.
38. Id. at 1352–53.
39. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 379 (2004).
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the government had not proved a sovereign acts defense, but
nonetheless the contract’s terms were not breached.40 In
addition, because there was a contract and the government
was acting in its commercial capacity, there could not be a
separate takings claim.41 Plaintiffs moved for rehearing and
the government asked for an amended sovereign acts
analysis.42 Stockton East II confirmed both that the shortage
provision in the contract applied and that the government had
not proved its sovereign acts defense.43
On appeal, Stockton East III mostly reversed on the contract
claims, noting that at the time of the contracts, the relevant
law gave high priority to consumptive uses like irrigation.44
Congress subsequently added fish and wildlife to the project’s
purpose, prioritizing them on the level with irrigation.45 It
rejected a defense that contracts are “inherently” subject to
changes in the sovereign’s own (federal) law, found a breach of
the contract for all but two years, and concluded that the
government failed to prove a sovereign acts defense.46 For
those two years that plaintiffs failed to show a breach, the
panel vacated the takings claim dismissal, allowing plaintiffs
to proceed with those claims.47
Finally, in Klamath Irrigation District v. United States,
pursuant to a biological opinion that project operations would
harm endangered fish, Reclamation completely terminated
water delivery during critically dry spells.48 Plaintiffs,
individual agriculture landowners plus drainage and irrigation
districts, brought contract and takings claims. In Klamath I,
the trial court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were
properly “sound in contract, not takings.”49 The takings claims
40. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East I), 75 Fed. Cl. 321,
373–75 (2007) (the “contracts were not breached, according to their terms”).
41. Id. at 373–74.
42. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East II), 76 Fed. Cl. 497,
499, 508 (2007).
43. Id. at 500–12.
44. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344,
1351, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2009), on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1365–68.
47. Id. at 1368–69.
48. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath I), 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 534
(2005).
49. Id.
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were “entirely subsumed within the contract claim,” and the
court dismissed the takings claims.50 In Klamath II, the trial
court turned to the contracts.51 It did not attempt to apply the
shortage clause or other breach criteria because it determined
that any breach was immunized by the sovereign acts
doctrine.52
On appeal, the Federal Circuit certified three state-law
questions to the Oregon Supreme Court, and Oregon
accepted.53 In Klamath III, Oregon determined, inter alia, that
Oregon law did not preclude a person putting water to
beneficial use from acquiring a beneficial or equitable property
interest in the water right to which the United States held
legal title.54
Finally, based on Oregon’s pronouncements, in Klamath IV
the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court judgment and
remanded.55 For the takings claims, the court remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the state decision and with
the instruction to determine whether the contractual
relationship altered the picture such that plaintiffs had no
cognizable property interests to form the basis of their takings
claims.56 For the contract claims, the court remanded for a
determination of whether the government can establish
“impossibility” for purposes of its sovereign acts defense, and
whether it breached the contracts.57
B.

Contract Claims and the Sovereign Acts Doctrine

As the current trio illustrates, there are at least two basic
ways a government can successfully defend against a contract
claim: as a matter of straight contract law or via the sovereign
acts doctrine.
50. Id. at 535.
51. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath II), 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007).
52. Id. at 685.
53. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
questions accepted, 202 P.3d 159 (Ore. 2009).
54. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath III), 227 P.3d 1145, 1169
(Ore. 2010).
55. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV), 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
56. Id. at 507, 519–20. In addition, plaintiff pressed claims of a violation of the
Klamath Basin Compact, id. at 510, 519, an issue beyond this article’s scope.
57. Id. at 507–08.
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The first avenue turns on the terms of the contract and
applies the same rules of contract law that apply to private
parties. For example, in the paradigmatic federal water project
scenario, private interests have long-standing contract rights
to use water from that project. Those contracts typically
contain some type of exculpatory “shortages” clause expressly
eliminating government liability in certain circumstances.
Pursuant to environmental statutes (often passed after the
contracts were entered) the government restricts (or there is a
dispute over whether the government should restrict) such
historic water uses subsequently determined to harm fish. One
question is whether that exculpatory clause applies.
In O’Neil v. United States, the government entered into a
contract with a water district to construct a project and furnish
plaintiffs with water.58 The contract expressly stated that the
government was not liable “for any damage, direct or indirect,
arising from a shortage on account of errors in operation,
drought or any other cause.”59 Congress later enacted the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA).60 To avoid jeopardizing certain fish
species, the government reduced water distributions.61 The
Ninth Circuit found that the “shortage” clause was
unambiguous and contained no enumerated exceptions, and
that the ESA and the CVPIA (even if enacted post-contract)
were “other causes,” precluding liability.62 The exculpatory
clause thus excused the government from full performance,
and no contract breach occurred.63
In contrast, the Federal Circuit in Stockton East III handled
a similar dispute also involving the Central Valley Project, but
there the relevant contract contained a less sweeping
exculpatory clause, excusing shortages traceable to “drought,
or other causes . . . beyond the control of the United States.”64
The panel reasoned that, unlike drought or something like an
58. O’Neil v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 681.
60. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et. seq. (ESA); Pub.L. No. 102-575, 106 State 4706 et.
seq. (CVPIA)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 683–84.
63. Id. at 687.
64. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009), on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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earthquake or sabotage, changes in federal law and policy that
sparked the pertinent restrictions were well within the
government’s control.65 Under the “beyond the control of the
United States” language, (which was narrower than the “any
other cause” language in O’Neil) the panel agreed that the
government was immunized by the exculpatory clause for two
of the years, but not for the other five.66
This article will not further analyze the language of various
contracts or discuss when particular exculpatory clauses are
robust enough to provide a defense in the scenario where the
government withholds water deliveries for environmental
reasons. It suffices that in certain scenarios, applying the
specific terms of the contract to a specific fact pattern, the
government will be adjudged to have acted within the rights
spelled out in the contracts, while in other scenarios the
government’s conduct, absent some affirmative defense, will be
adjudged a breach.
The second avenue by which the government can defeat a
contract claim turns on the special, only-available-to-thegovernment affirmative defense provided by the sovereign acts
doctrine.67 The sovereign acts doctrine recognizes that the
government wears two hats—a proprietary hat, acting as a
party to a contract, and a sovereign hat, acting as a regulator.
In water rights clashes, the government acts both as a
contractor (Reclamation wearing its proprietary hat,
administering a contract involving distribution of water) and
as a regulator (the environmental agency like the National
Marine Fisheries Service or the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service wearing the sovereign hat, ordering parties to
do or not do something in furtherance of some environmental
end). In the paradigmatic example, the environmental agency
orders Reclamation to take steps to preserve fish, steps that
may make it impossible for Reclamation to meet its
contractual obligations.
The general rule from contract law is that a contracting
party cannot discharge her contract duties when her own
actions have made contract performance impossible.68
65. Id. at 1362.
66. Id. at 1363–64.
67. The sovereign acts defense is an affirmative one. Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v.
Geren, 550 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
68. See Carabetta Enters. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Ordinarily, then, the United States would be liable for breach
where one of its own agencies makes it impossible for
Reclamation to perform. The sovereign acts doctrine provides
an exception to this rule, an escape clause (where applicable)
for the government.69 The basic test comes from the plurality
opinion of United States v. Winstar Corporation.70 As the
Federal Circuit most recently framed it, the test asks:
whether the sovereign act is properly attributable to the
Government as contractor. That is, is the act simply one
designed to relieve the Government of its contract
duties, or is it a genuinely public and general act that
only incidentally falls upon the contract? If the answer
is that the act is a genuine public and general act, the
second part of the test asks whether that act would
otherwise release the Government from liability under
ordinary principles of contract law. This second
question turns on what is known in contract law as the
impossibility (sometimes impracticability) defense.71
This article next turns to these two components, public and
general/incidental impact and impossibility/impracticability.
They have been considered by the trial and appellate courts in
Casitas, Stockton East, and Klamath, with disparate results.
1.

Public and General Acts Only Incidentally Falling Upon
Contracts

Where the sovereign act is specifically targeted at nullifying
contract rights, the government fails the “public and general
act only incidentally falling upon a contract” (hereinafter
“public and general”) test.72 For example, in United States v.
Westlands Water District, the government had contracted for
water and for drainage service.73 Those contract terms later
became economically disadvantageous to the government. In
response Congress “abrogated” the rates and required that the
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 839–40, 904 (1996).
71. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV), 635 F.3d 505, 521 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).
72. See Conner Bros. Constr., 550 F.3d at 1374, 1376. (“[T]he sovereign acts defense
is unavailable where the governmental action is specifically directed at nullifying
contract rights.”).
73. See United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1142 (E.D.
Cal. 2001).
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agency charge its “full cost” to plaintiff.74 The court had little
trouble rejecting the sovereign acts defense.75 The government
was, in a sense, trying to rig the system to remove unpalatable
contract terms, an end-around the court was not about to
allow.
Turning to the trio of cases, and in dramatic contrast to
Westlands, the government’s application of the ESA in Casitas
and Klamath easily passed the public and general test. As
Casitas I explained, an ESA-based restriction is not a “form of
governmental self-help,” or “suspect” as being in the
government’s “self interest,” or designed to accrue “economic
advantage” but is “public and general in its reach.”76 As
Klamath II phrased it, the ESA was not “‘tainted by
governmental object of self-relief” and not passed to benefit the
government as a contractor.77
The Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA)
involved in Stockton East is somewhere between the ESA and
the statute applied in Westlands. The CVPIA was not the
naked money grab of Westlands, yet one CVPIA purpose was to
bring “basic economic reforms to narrow the gap between the
cost to the taxpayer of supplying CVP water and the prices
paid for the water by CVP water users,”78 perhaps sliding it
more to the Westlands end of the spectrum. And the CVPIA is
not so public and general in reach as the ESA; unlike the ESA,
which applies to a broad swath of public and private actions
involving federal contracts and non-contractual scenarios
alike, the CVPIA is limited to CVP project decisions, the
majority of which will involve government contracts. Yet the
CVPIA explicitly protects, restores and enhances habitat and
attempts to achieve a “reasonable balance” among competing
demands for project water,79 sliding it away from the
Westlands end of the spectrum. In short, the “essential
74. Id. at 1144.
75. Id. at 1153–54.
76. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas I), 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 753–55
(2006), aff’d in relevant part, 543 F.3d 1276, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Casitas III),
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
77. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath II), 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 685
(2007) (internal quotations omitted).
78. Carl Boronkay & Timothy Quinn, The Central Valley Project Improvement Act:
An Urban Perspective, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (1993).
79. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009), on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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characteristic”80 of the CVPIA may be open to interpretation.
Stockton East III could have avoided doing violence to the
sovereign acts doctrine had it distinguished the CVPIA from
the ESA and then found that the government failed to meet
the public and general test on this ground.
Unfortunately, Stockton East III found targeting not based
on any difference between the CVPIA versus the ESA, but
because Reclamation’s “operational decisions” negatively
affected only plaintiffs and thus were “directly aimed” at the
contracts.81 Given that narrow definition, the government
failed the test.82 But so would almost any agency applying any
statutory restriction to any party. For laws to impact a
government contract, at some point some agency must take
some step. And where it does, the agency is almost by
definition “targeting” something or someone. Stockton East III
cannot be correct on this point, as such an approach would
virtually eliminate the doctrine’s application. “Applying” any
statute, even the ESA, to any particular case “targets” the
limited set of parties involved in that case, in that sense of the
word “target.”
Stockton East III’s shortcoming was not due to focusing on
administrative versus congressional action. Indeed, Casitas I
deemed it appropriate to focus on agency actions under the
ESA, instead of on the ESA itself, and Casitas III seemed to
affirm this focus.83 One could certainly envision a targeting
scenario at the agency level. Revisit the Westlands scenario,
where the government contracted for water and for drainage
service and discovered that those contract terms had become
economically unpalatable.84 Suppose that, instead of Congress
stepping in and abrogating the contact rates in favor of
recouping Reclamation’s full costs, Congress stayed silent.85
Reclamation could have attempted to cut its costs by creating

80. Cf. United States Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
81. Stockton East III, 583 F.3d at 1367.
82. Id. at 1367–68.
83. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas I), 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 754
(2006), aff’d, 543 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Casitas III), reh’g and reh’g en banc
denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
84. See United States v. Westlands Water Dist. 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1142–44 (E.D.
Cal. 2001).
85. Contra id. at 1144.
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an environmental roadblock to limit the amount of water
deliveries (and thus limit the volume of losing transactions).
That would be the type of “targeting” the courts disfavor.86
Stockton East III did not point to any evidence of any such
self-dealing.87 In direct contrast to the hypothetical in the
preceding
paragraph,
Reclamation
typically
resists
applications of an environmental statute that would curb
water deliveries in a particular project until a court orders
otherwise.88 Reclamation simply applying an environmental
statute to a specific party is not “targeting” per the sovereign
acts doctrine. As Conner Brothers Construction Company v.
United States explained the Federal Circuit’s rule, where
government action is “relatively free of Government selfinterest” and is not “tainted by a government objective of selfrelief,” it is a public and general act.89 Government actions
“affecting a single contractor can be shielded by the sovereign
acts doctrine;” simply because the government has to make
“case-specific determinations” does not “convert an otherwise
public and general act into a nongeneral one.”90 Stockton East
III could not override Conner Brothers.91
The other Circuit water opinions are more consistent with
the accepted approach. Casitas III had no trouble finding
Reclamation’s act a public and general one (notwithstanding
86. See, e.g., United States Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569,
1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Targeting” looks at the “purpose” of the government’s
action, whether, “on balance” the government focused on something like retroactive
price increases or abrogating contract “for reasons of the economy.”); Franconia Assocs.
v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 718, 734 (2004) (discussing government action motivated
by a “desire to correct what it perceives to be an overly generous deal”).
87. Conversely, Casitas I flatly rejected the argument that the agency was
attempting to relieve itself from contractual responsibilities or act in its economic selfinterest. 72 Fed. Cl. at 754–55.
88. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV), 635 F.3d 505,
508 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n. v. Patterson, 204
F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999)); Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109,
1113–14, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003) (Reclamation unsuccessfully argued to the district and
appellate courts that it had no discretion to reduce water deliveries in the face of ESAmandated restriction.), vacated by 355 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (dismissing
the appeal as moot). See also Casitas I, 72 Fed. Cl. at 748–49 (Reclamation acted only
after environmental group threatened suit).
89. Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v. Geren, 550 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) as controlling authority).
90. Id. at 1376.
91. Hernandez-Garcia v. Nicholson, 485 F.3d 651, 653 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (panel bound
by previous, precedential decision, absent Supreme Court or en banc intervention).
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that it applied only to Casitas).92 And Klamath IV agreed that
halting water deliveries in response to a biological assessment
was a “genuine” public and general act that “only incidentally
fell upon” the relevant contracts.93 In short, the public-andgeneral inquiry is unlikely to be a serious hurdle for the
government in the scenario where the government restricts
water deliveries in furtherance of some environmental end.
2.

Impossibility (Impracticability)

Instead, the second component, applying the “impossibility”
(or more accurately “commercial impracticality,” not “actual or
literal impossibility”)94 portion of the sovereign acts doctrine
where an agency applies an environmental statute to restrict
consumption water uses, provides the far more interesting
challenge. The trial and appellate panels have offered vastly
differing inquiries in the water trio.
Klamath II did not undertake the impossibility component of
the sovereign acts doctrine.95 At the time Klamath II was
decided, the Federal Circuit had not yet adopted the
impossibility requirement from United States v. Winstar.96
Winstar had no clear majority, instead featuring a “fragmented
set of opinions” that made it “simply not possible to reconcile
the various views expressed by the Justices in Winstar.”97
After Klamath II, however, the Federal Circuit definitively
determined that impossibility was an “additional requirement”
of a successful sovereign acts defense.98 It would soon adopt
the Winstar plurality as setting forth the “core principles
92. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas III), 543 F.3d 1276,
1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
93. Klamath IV, 635 F.3d at 521.
94. Id. at 522 (quoting with approval Seaboard Lumber v. United States, 308 F.3d
1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (only “a showing of commercial impracticability,” not
“actual or literal impossibility,” is required).
95. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath II), 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 688–89
(2007). See also Klamath IV, 635 F.3d at 522 (trial court failed to undertake the
impossibility component of the sovereign acts defense).
96. Cf. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 904 (1996).
97. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 514, 540 n.9 (2000)
(quotations and citations omitted).
98. Carabetta Enters. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Klamath II was issued March 16, just prior to Carabetta’s April 4 publication. See
Klamath II, 75 Fed. Cl. at 677.
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underlying the sovereign acts doctrine.”99
Yet even removing the low-hanging fruit and recognizing
that impossibility is part of the sovereign acts inquiry, the
remaining opinions offer materially different approaches on
how exactly to apply the concept. Some variations seem
relatively easy for the government to meet, others less so. The
article starts with the other trial courts and moves to the
Federal Circuit.
Casitas I rejected plaintiff’s argument that because other
options were available to the government to protect the
steelhead while allowing Casitas to retain the water supply
(such as fish trapping and trucking), the government’s
obligation to “honor” Casitas’ rights was not rendered
impossible by the ESA.100 Whether Congress had directly
imposed the restriction, or whether the implementing details
were left for administrative determination, the governmental
action was sovereign in character and provided a defense.101
Simply because the agency could have ensured fish passage by
other means did not alter the sovereign character of the act or
create liability.102
Conversely, Stockton East I and II expressed concern that,
without a “means to dampen the exuberance of the sovereign
acts doctrine,” the door would be too open to “wide-ranging
immunity for non-performance” by the government.103 The
doctrine of impossibility, or at least “partial impossibility,”
offered that damper.104 Thus, a court should consider whether
operational decisions could have been made to fulfill the ESA
without impacting contractual rights,105 or whether sufficient
water remained to allow full allocations to plaintiffs.106 The
99. Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v. Geren, 550 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
100. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas I), 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 755
(2006), aff’d, 543 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Casitas III), reh’g and reh’g en banc
denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 755. The court had already rejected the argument that the agency was
attempting to relieve itself from contractual responsibilities or act in its economic selfinterest. Id. at 754–55.
102. Id. at 755.
103. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East II), 76 Fed. Cl. 497,
512 (2007).
104. See id. at 509.
105. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East I), 75 Fed. Cl. 321,
373 (2007).
106. Stockton East II, 76 Fed. Cl. at 510.
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government was not entitled to a sovereign acts defense
because the government did not prove performance was
impossible or commercially impracticable.107
At the Federal Circuit, Casitas III determined that
“performance by the government is excused under the
sovereign acts defense only when the sovereign act renders the
government’s performance impossible,”108 which on the surface
appears plaintiff-friendly. But the panel rejected Casitas’s
argument that because the agency could have chosen an
alternative method to meet the ESA (such as fish trapping and
trucking), the ESA had not made it impossible for the
government to perform its contractual obligation.109 It did not
matter that Congress had left the implementing details to the
discretion of the agency; the biological opinion was part of the
sovereign act, making it impossible for Reclamation to perform
its contractual duties.110
Stockton East III agreed with the trial court that the
government failed to show that the agencies’ discretionary
implementation of the CVPIA made it impossible to deliver the
full amount of water to claimants.111 The Federal Circuit left
open whether the sovereign act at issue was the CVPIA itself
or the discretionary, operational decision by the federal
agencies.112
Because the Klamath trial court had determined that
impossibility was not a component of the sovereign acts
doctrine, the Federal Circuit in Klamath IV had little
opportunity to analyze the precise confines of impossibility,
beyond noting that the trial court had erred in holding that
impossibility was not a factor to consider.113 The panel
remanded to allow the government to establish that its
performance was impossible.114 The panel did confirm that

107. Stockton East I, 75 Fed. Cl. at 373.
108. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas III), 543 F.3d 1276, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
109. Id. at 1287–88.
110. Id.
111. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g denied, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
112. Id.
113. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV), 635 F.3d 505, 522 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
114. Id. at 522.
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only “a showing of commercial impracticability,” not “actual or
literal impossibility” was the standard.115
This article will not hazard a guess at precisely how
impossibility will play out in the scenario where the
government withholds water deliveries for environmental
reasons. Parallel to the above analysis of contract language
and exculpatory clauses, it suffices that there will be some
scenarios where it will be impracticable for the government to
provide all the acre-feet of water all the claimants would
otherwise have been entitled to under the contact and still
meet an environmental mandate. The sovereign acts doctrine
is robust enough that in a not insignificant portion of cases
where an environmental restriction prevents the government
from meeting its contract obligations, the government will
have a viable sovereign acts defense for at least a portion of
the contract breach. And that sets the stage for the
intersection of the Takings Clause and contracts.
III. ARE TAKINGS CLAIMS TRUMPED BY CONTRACT
CLAIMS?
The above analysis provides the context for the crucial (and
divergently answered) question of whether, assuming a party
has (or is a third-party beneficiary to) a contract with the
government and the government takes some adverse action,
the party has both a contract claim and a takings claim. It is
axiomatic that rights arising out of a contract with the
government are “protected by the Fifth Amendment.”116
However, it is also aphoristic that where rights are voluntarily
created by contract, a takings theory has “limited application”;
if the government interferes with such contractual rights it
“generally” gives rise only to a breach of contract claim, not a
takings claim.117
The cases discussed in this article are in accord in that a
court may defer the takings issue until after it addresses the
contract claim, and if a claimant is successful on that contract

115. Id. (quoting with approval Seaboard Lumber v. United States, 308 F.3d 1283,
1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
116. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
117. St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sun Oil
Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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claim, she cannot also recover on a takings theory.118 The rub,
instead, is whether a takings claim is available where a
claimant loses a particular contract claim. That is, does a
contract claim have to be merely available or actually viable
before a court will dismiss the takings claim? Starting with the
trial courts and moving onto the Circuit, the water cases have
answered that differently. This article next recaps how each
court handled the intersection of the contract and takings
claims.
Casitas I raised, but then did not seem to answer, whether
the water diversion actually breached the terms of the
contract.119 Instead, it determined that the sovereign acts
doctrine provided a valid defense.120 Having dismissed the
contract claims on the basis of the sovereign acts doctrine, the
trial court turned, in Casitas II, to the takings claim, analyzing
the takings issue on its merits.121
Stockton East I and II rejected the government’s sovereign
act defense to plaintiffs’ contract claims.122 However, the trial
court found that the government did not breach the terms of
the contract, determining that the government’s water
restrictions fit within the parameters of the contracts’
exculpatory clause.123 As to the takings claims, the court ruled
that because the “government acted primarily in its
commercial capacity . . . not its sovereign capacity,” plaintiffs
could not assert a takings claim even after they lost the
contract claim.124 Thus the court dismissed the takings claim
without ruling on its merits.125
Klamath I held that the “availability of contract remedies is
sufficient to vitiate a takings claim, even if it ultimately is
118. See Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d
1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g denied, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Castle v.
United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy,
Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
119. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas I), 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 752–53
(2006).
120. Id. at 755.
121. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas II), 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 101
(2007).
122. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East I), 75 Fed. Cl. 321,
372–73 (2007), modified in part, 76 Fed. Cl. 497, 508–12 (2007) (Stockton East II).
123. Stockton East I, 75 Fed. Cl. at 363–64.
124. Id. at 373–74.
125. Id.
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determined that no breach occurred.”126 Because the contracts
gave rise to the private property rights in question, for those
parties with contracts or in privity of contract (i.e. third-party
beneficiaries) “the proper remedy for the alleged infringement
lies in a contract claim, not one for a takings.”127 Plaintiffs’
takings claim was “entirely subsumed within the contract
claim,” even where the government defeated the contract claim
under a sovereign acts defense.128 The court dismissed the
takings claim in Klamath I even before turning to the contract
claim in Klamath II.129
Moving to the Federal Circuit, Casitas III affirmed the
contract claim dismissal, but only after determining that the
water diversions actually breached the terms of the contract
(an issue the trial court in Casitas I had seemingly not
answered).130 The panel agreed with Casitas I that the
sovereign acts doctrine provided the government a defense.131
The panel then proceeded (as had Casitas II) to address the
merits of the takings claim, though the panel reversed on
which (physical versus regulatory) takings analysis was the
correct one.132
Stockton East III agreed with the trial court that the
government could not show a sovereign act defense for any of
the years at issue.133 For five of the seven years at issue, the
panel reversed the trial court as a matter of straight contract
law: the shortages clause did not apply in those years and the
government breached the contract.134 However, for the two
years it agreed there was no contract breach, the panel vacated
the takings claim dismissal.135 It reasoned that a court may
126. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath I), 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 532
(2005).
127. Id. at 532.
128. Id. at 535.
129. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath II), 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 678
(2005) (citing Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 539–40).
130. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas I), 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 752–55
(2006), aff’d on other grounds, 543 F.3d 1276, 1286–88 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Casitas III),
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
131. Casitas I, 72 Fed. Cl. at 753–55, aff’d, Casitas III, 543 F.3d at 1287–88.
132. Id. at 1295–96.
133. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344,
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g denied, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
134. Id. at 1364.
135. Id. at 1369. The panel did not explicitly state that the takings claim dismissal
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defer the takings issue until after addressing the contract
claim, but it cannot deny a contract claim and then find the
takings claim precluded.136 Judge Gajarsa dissented.137 When
the court denied rehearing, Judge Gajarsa again dissented,
disagreeing with “the majority’s conclusion that a party to a
contract with the United States, having failed to establish
damages in a contract action, may proceed with a Fifth
Amendment takings action.”138
Finally, Klamath IV also reversed the trial court, allowing
both the takings and contracts claims to proceed on remand.139
But, as analyzed below, Klamath IV involved a complex variety
of plaintiffs, contracts, patents, and other rights. Additionally,
the court was reviewing a trial court decision that barred the
takings claim from proceeding, despite the fact that the
government had prevailed on a sovereign acts defense. Even
Judge Gajarsa, having emphatically dissented in Stockton East
III and again on rehearing, concurred in the judgment in
Klamath IV, noting that his view differed by only a “limited
degree” with the majority and agreeing that remand was
appropriate.140 Thus Klamath IV did not take a definitive
stand on the question this article analyzes.
This article next turns to the outliers—and opposite
extremes—of Stockton East III and Klamath I. The analysis
first covers why no takings claim should be available where
the government does not breach the terms of the contract and
then why a takings claim should be available where the
government commits what would otherwise be a contract
breach but escapes liability under a sovereign acts defense.141
was to be vacated for only the two non-breach years, but given its acknowledgement
that “when a plaintiff is awarded recovery for the alleged wrong under one theory,
there is no reason to address the other theories,” the scope of its vacation seems fairly
certain. Id. at 1368.
136. Id. at 1368–69.
137. Id. at 1369.
138. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 638 F.3d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
139. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV), 635 F.3d 505, 522 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
140. Id. at 525 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
141. See Kevin R. Garden, Fifth Amendment Takings of Rights Arising from
Agreements with the Federal Government, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187, 202 (2000) (If the
government is acting in its proprietary capacity, “any resulting interference with the
contract will be subject to a potential breach-of-contract claim, but not a takings
claim,” but if the government invokes the sovereign acts defense, “its interference may

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012

23

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

148 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:1

A.

No Breach, No Taking

Where a government contracts with a party, and the
government takes an action in accordance with rights provided
to it by the contract, the contracting party (or a third party
beneficiary) unhappy with the government’s act should not be
able to claim that the act worked as a taking. The party’s claim
should solely be one for breach of contract; there should be no
second “bite at the apple”142 through a takings claim. First,
Plaintiff retained all the remedies any contracting party was
entitled to. Second, the government did no more than it was
allowed to do under the contract, acting in its proprietary
(rather than sovereign) capacity,143 and the government can
only cause a taking when acting in its sovereign capacity.
Third, the contract terms were inherent limitations in
plaintiff’s property interest, and thus plaintiff had no
cognizable property right to take. Fourth, basic symmetry of
contract rights and responsibilities necessitates such an
outcome. And fifth, allowing a takings claim to proceed violates
the maxim that the Takings Clause has “limited applicability”
to contracts with the government.
First, where the contract says the government can do X and
the government does X, the government has not rescinded any
remedy the plaintiff possessed. A contract is a promise from
the government “either to regulate. . . consistently with the
contract’s terms, or to pay damages for breach.”144 Thus any
“remedies arise from the contracts themselves, rather than
from the constitutional protection of private property
rights.”145 Where a plaintiff retains the range of contract
remedies accorded any contracting party, a contract claim is
generally the proper remedy.146 That she lost the contract

be subject to a takings claim.”).
142. Cf. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
143. As opposed to the government’s more typical “sovereign” or regulatory capacity,
the government acts in a “proprietary” or commercial capacity when it “steps off the
throne” and engages in transactions “individuals and corporations engage in among
themselves.” Stovall v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 696, 698 (2006) (quoting Kania v.
United States, 650 F.2d 264, 268–69 (Fed. Cir. 1981)).
144. Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
145. See, e.g., Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
146. Envtl. Safety Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 100 (2010) (The
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claim is a function of straight contract law.
Some courts have tried to restrict the “limited applicability”
concept to only the scenario where the plaintiff actually wins
the contract claim.147 These courts reason that contract
remedies need not only be available, they must be viable (i.e.
plaintiff must actually win) to warrant dismissing the takings
claim.148 But making the answer to whether a takings claim is
available dependent on the result of plaintiff’s contract claim
flies in the face of most doctrines of contract and takings law,
where it is the availability of a claim, not the result, that
matters.
For example, in the contracts arena, the economic loss
doctrine bars recovery in tort of purely pecuniary loses caused
by a breach of contractual duty.149 The doctrine prohibits tort
claims for economic losses to which entitlement flows from a
contract150 and keeps contract law from “drown[ing] in a sea of
tort.”151 The crucial element, for purposes of this article, is that
the economic loss doctrine bars certain tort claims even where
the contract claim itself fails.152 It is the availability of the
contract claim, and not the success of the claim, that
determines whether an alternative form of relief is allowed.
Staying within the contracts arena, the Contracts Clause
does not bar a state or municipality from breaching a contract,
so long as plaintiff retains the contract remedy.153 The analysis
turns on the “availability” of a contract damages remedy,154 not
court concluded that the government acted in its proprietary capacity when it
terminated the contracts, and “any remedy plaintiffs have is a remedy arising under
their contracts with the government, not under the Takings Clause.”).
147. Henry Housing Ltd. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 250, 256 (2010).
148. See, e.g., id.; Consumers Energy Co. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 152, 158
(2008); System Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 163, 172–73 (2005); Detroit
Edison Co. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 299, 301 (2003).
149. Dubinsky v. Mermart, LLC, 595 F.3d 812, 819 (8th Cir. 2010).
150. Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963) (Where the
complained-of “tort” is based entirely upon the government’s breach of its contract
promise, the “claim is in substance a breach of contract claim.”).
151. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986).
152. See, e.g., Rochester-Genesee Regional Transp. Auth. v. Cummins Inc., No. 09CV-6370-MAT, 2010 WL 2998768, at *9, *11 (W.D.N.Y. July 28, 2010); Aslani v.
Country Creek Homes, Inc., No. 2007AP503, 2008 WL 220714, at *1, *5 (Wisc. App.
2008).
153. Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2011).
154. TM Park Ave. Assocs. v. Pataki, 214 F.3d 344, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
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plaintiff’s ultimate success. Even where the plaintiff loses on
the contract claim, if her “failure to recover” is due to
application of the “bargained-for provisions” of the contract,
the government has only prevented a damages remedy
“through the valid operation” of the terms of the contract
itself,155 not through a Contract Clause-violating impairment
of the contract remedy. Again, it is the availability of the
contract remedy, not the outcome, that matters.156
Moving to the takings arena, a claimant typically may not,
in prosecuting a takings claim, attack the validity of the
government’s decisions where she had the opportunity to
directly challenge that validity.157 That she pursued such a
claim and lost on the merits, or would now be time-barred from
pursuing that challenge, does not permit her to litigate that
claim in a takings action.158 The availability of the challenge,
not the success is what matters. Similarly, equitable relief is
typically not available to enjoin an alleged taking when a
plaintiff can instead sue the sovereign for compensation.159 The
rule does not depend on whether a particular claimant actually
wins or loses that compensation suit.
The result is the same where the plaintiff loses the contract
claim on statute of limitations grounds. The plaintiff may have
had a protected contract right that was breached, yet no
remedy will be forthcoming. That a plaintiff has forgone a
remedy does not change the equation. The plaintiff still
retained the unfettered ability to enforce the contract
according to its terms,160 the “right to try to establish their
contract damages.”161 She simply failed to timely exercise that
right. Thus the court in Tamerlane v. United States dismissed
the contract claims as time-barred and then concluded that the
plaintiffs’ failure to timely sue extinguished their claim for
breach of contract and consequently there was no taking

155. Id.
156. Id. See also Pitsch Recycling & Disposal, Inc. v. County of Ionia, 386 F. Supp.
2d 938, 941 (W.D. Mich. 2005).
157. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
158. Id.
159. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984).
160. Janicki Logging Co., v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346 (1996), aff’d, No. 975006, 1997 WL 468285 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
161. Home Sav. of America, F.S.B. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 487, 495 (2002)
(emphasis added).
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either.162
The second ground rests on the distinction between the
government acting in a proprietary or a sovereign capacity.
Only sovereign acts are subject to the Takings Clause.163
“Taking claims rarely arise under government contracts
because the Government acts in its commercial or proprietary
capacity in entering contracts, rather than in its sovereign
capacity.”164 A plaintiff’s claim against a government acting
solely in its proprietary capacity is for breach of contract.165
Where the government acts “pursuant to and consistent with
the terms of the contract,” then “rather than acting as a
sovereign and taking plaintiff’s property,” the government is
acting as a party to the contract and exercising rights for
which it has bargained.166 Such a dispute raises no
constitutional issues and is “nothing more than a garden
variety contract dispute.”167 The claim is for breach of contract
and “the Fifth Amendment does not apply.”168
Third, turning to basic property rights principles, the
threshold test in a takings analysis is whether the claimant
has established a property interest for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. Where a claimant “fails to demonstrate the
existence of a legally cognizable property interest, the court’s
task is at an end.”169 The analysis is not simply whether a
claimant possesses some compensable right, but whether the

162. Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 724, 738 (2008) (“[I]t was
plaintiffs’ inaction in failing to [timely] sue on their claims for breach of
contract . . . that extinguished Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. No taking lies upon
these facts.”), aff’d, 550 F.3d 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
163. E.g., St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Textainer Equip. Mgmt. Ltd. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011);
Envtl. Safety Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 100 (2010); Nwogu v.
United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 637, 661 (2010).
164. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citations omitted). But see Henry Housing Ltd. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl.
250, 255 (2010) (The distinction between sovereign and proprietary acts is “not
necessarily meaningful” in all contexts and “does not materially advance the analysis
of either a breach of contract or a takings claim.”).
165. Hughes Commc’ns., 271 F.3d at 1070.
166. Janicki Logging v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346 (1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d
226 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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particular “use interest proscribed by the governmental action
was part of the owner’s title to begin with, i.e. whether
the. . .use interest was a stick in the bundle of property rights
acquired by the owner.”170 Where the government can show
that a limitation inhered in the title itself, no taking can
occur.171
This inherent limitation in title is what transpired for the
two relevant years in Stockton East. All the judges examining
the conflict agreed that for those two years the claimants had
no right, under the relevant conditions and per the four
corners of the contract, to more water than they actually
received.172 The terms of the contract itself created an inherent
limitation in title: plaintiffs simply had no compensable rights
for the government to take.173 And that lack of a specific,
compensable stick in the bundle ends a takings claim prior to
any liability analysis.174 If “a contract theory does not yield a
recovery, [it] does not give life to a takings theory. If the
contract remedy does not produce a recovery, it is because the
contract did not give a right to recovery.”175 A mere “failure of
proof” on the contract claims does not allow a takings claim to
proceed.176
It would be counter-intuitive if the takings clause protected
as a compensable right something that the relevant contract
does not. A contract “right” may exist when, for instance, “the
need to obtain government approvals so qualified the likely
future enjoyment of [those] rights that the contract, in
practice, amounted primarily to an opportunity to try to
obtain” certain rights.177 Yet such a “right” would likely not
170. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citation omitted).
171. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992).
Specifically in the water context, a takings claim will “ultimately rest on the scope of
[plaintiff’s] right to use [the] decreed water rights.” Kobobel v. Colorado, Dep’t. of
Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1132 (Colo. 2011).
172. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East I), 75 Fed. Cl. 321,
363–64 (2007), modified, 76 Fed. Cl. 497 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 583 F.3d
1344, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009), on reh’g in part, 638 F.3d 781, 783–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
173. Cf. Gray, supra note 2, at § 23-41 (A water project’s “contract terms will
determine whether plaintiff have the property rights they claim in the takings
litigation.”).
174. See Placer Mining Co., v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 681, 686 (2011).
175. Home Sav. of America, F.S.B. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 487, 495–96 (2002).
176. Id. at 495.
177. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc., 530 U.S. 604, 620 (2000).
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qualify as a sufficient property interest for purposes of a
takings analysis.178
Fourth, holding otherwise creates a pro-plaintiff asymmetry
in contract law, making every scenario a “Heads I win, tails
you pay me to lose” proposition. If the private party exercises
its rights under the terms of the contract and the government
suffers, the party need not pay the government for exercising
her contract rights. Yet if the government does the same, it
need not pay contract damages but it risks a takings claim for
just compensation. Or, framed from the perspective of the
government agency administering the contract, if the agency
takes some action and the action is later determined not to
accord with the contract, the contracting party may file a
breach claim. If the action is later determined to be in
accordance with the contract, the contracting party may file a
takings claim. That is not a symmetrical playing field.
Fifth and finally, to allow a plaintiff to advance a takings
claim when she loses her contract claim violates the Federal
Circuit’s oft-repeated rule that the takings concept has limited
application where rights are voluntarily created by contract
and the teaching that taking claims “rarely arise under
government contract.”179 It would functionally change “limited
application” to “general application” and change “rarely arise”
to “arise whenever the plaintiff loses the contract claim.”
Returning to Stockton East III, there should not have been
any takings claims to remand. For those five years where the
panel found a breach and no sovereign acts defense, the
plaintiff was entitled to contract damages. When a plaintiff
recovers under one theory, there is no need to address the
other theories.180 And for the two years the government did not
breach the contract, the government did no more than it was
explicitly allowed to do under the contract, acting as a
contracting party, not as a coercive sovereign.181 The sovereign

178. See, e.g., Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (A
swordfishing permit fell “short of conferring a cognizable property interest” under the
Takings Clause even though plaintiff had already used it to obtain fish for over a
decade.).
179. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978)).
180. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344,
1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g granted in part, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
181. Id. at 1363–64.
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arm (the environmental agency) may have pushed the
proprietary arm (Reclamation) to act, but only to act within
the rights the contract already accorded Reclamation.
Plaintiffs retained their full range of contract remedies.
Plaintiffs simply had no right, per the limitations inherent in
the contract’s terms, to that forgone water. The panel should
not have concluded that in such a scenario plaintiffs retained a
justiciable takings claim.
B.

The Answer Reverses When the Government Successfully
Asserts a Sovereign Acts Defense

Conversely, the idea that the Takings Clause is inapplicable
even if the government breached the contract but escapes
contract liability by asserting a sovereign acts defense182
overreaches in the opposite direction. None of the five
rationales described above for why the Takings Clause does
not
protect
the
no-breach-per-the-terms-of-the-contract
scenario apply here. Just as a plaintiff should get no second
bite at the apple by having a takings claim in the no-breach
scenario, it seems equally illogical to let the government have
its cake and eat it too by barring a takings claim in the breachbut-sovereign-acts-defense scenario.
The first rationale for baring takings claims involving rights
created by contract with the government is that the claimant
remained “unfettered in its ability to. . .enforce the contract
according to its terms,”183 retaining the “right to try to
establish their contract damages.”184 Courts’ refusals to invoke
takings principles in the no-breach scenario directly results
from the availability of contract remedies.185 In the Federal
Circuit’s phrasing, the plaintiff typically retains the necessary
“range of remedies associated with the vindication of a
contract.”186
182. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath I), 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 536–38
(2005).
183. Janicki Logging v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346 (1996), aff’d, No. 97-5006,
1997 WL 468285 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
184. Home Sav. of America, F.S.B. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 487, 495 (2002)
(emphasis added).
185. Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 718, 737 (2004) (“refusal to
invoke takings principles has been explained as directly resulting from the availability
of contract remedies”).
186. Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
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Yet in the context of the government breaching the terms of
the contract but successfully asserting a sovereign act defense,
the government has deprived the claimant of just that ability.
The plaintiff would have had a viable claim according to the
terms of the contract. The sovereign acts doctrine is, by
definition, an exception to the normal rules of contract law,
allowing the government to escape liability where a private
party would not.187 Where the government takes actions that
no private party could, the Court has allowed the plaintiff to
proceed on a takings claim.188 And where the government
passes a law abrogating the government’s contractual
obligations, the Court has allowed the plaintiff to pursue a
takings claim.189 One predicts the Court would do the same
today.
This distinction is consistent with Contracts Clause
jurisprudence. While “it would be absurd to turn every breach
of contract. . .into a violation of the federal Constitution,”190
where the government both breaches a contract and impairs
the other party’s right to recover damages for that breach, the
government may run afoul of the Contracts Clause.191 Where
the government asserts an affirmative defense that it is
excused by law from performing the contract or paying
damages, the plaintiff may state a Contracts Clause
violation.192 Similarly, where the government breaches the
contract but successfully asserts a sovereign acts defense, it
has also impaired plaintiff’s ability to obtain a remedy. Such a
case would seem to “reach constitutional dimensions.”193 A
takings claim should be just as available here as where the
government restricts any other right.
The second rationale, the capacity issue, bars a takings
187. See Carabetta Enters., Inc. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (The sovereign acts doctrine is an exception to the general rule from contract law
that a contracting party cannot discharge its contract duties where party’s own actions
made contract performance impossible.).
188. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48–49 (1960).
189. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579–80 (1934).
190. Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Horowitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996)).
191. Cf. id.
192. Cf. id.
193. Cf. TM Park Ave. Assocs. v. Pataki, 214 F.3d 344, 349 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (a breach of contract claim does not reach
constitutional dimensions).
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claim where the government was acting only in its proprietary
(and not sovereign) capacity when it infringed on the contract
to which the plaintiff is privy.194 Only a sovereign act can
produce a taking; the government acting solely in its
proprietary capacity leaves plaintiffs with just a breach of
contract claim.195 Yet where the government wins on a
sovereign acts defense, it was by very definition acting in this
sovereign capacity.196 It is not clear why that sovereign act
should be any less challengeable as a taking than any other
sovereign act.197
Barring a takings claim here functionally allows the
government to have it both ways. First the government can
argue, for purposes of the takings analysis, that the restriction
was a product of the government acting in its proprietary, not
sovereign, capacity, thus precluding takings recovery. Then the
government can reverse course and argue, for purposes of the
contract analysis, that the restriction was the act of the
sovereign, not the contract player, thus precluding contract
recovery. This was what Klamath I and II functionally
permitted, finding that a takings claim was unavailable,
“entirely subsumed” within the contract claim, then finding
that the sovereign acts doctrine immunized any contract
breach.198
The third rationale, limitation-inhering-in-title, similarly
does not apply. Where the particular use interest proscribed by
the governmental action was not part of the owner’s title to
begin with, no takings claim arises.199 The limitation in the
title precluded a taking from occurring.200 Yet, where the
194. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citations omitted).
195. Id. See also St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Textainer Equip. Mgmt Ltd. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011);
Envtl. Safety Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 100 (2010); Nwogu v.
United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 637, 661 (2010).
196. After all, it is the “sovereign acts” defense, not the “proprietary acts” defense.
197. This is consistent with the maxim that “to effect a taking, the government must
act pursuant to its sovereign power or invoke sovereign protections.” Textainer
Equipment, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218 (emphasis added).
198. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 535 (2005), 75 Fed.
Cl. 677, 685, 695 (2007).
199. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted).
200. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992). This is
no different in the water context. A takings claim will “ultimately rest on the scope of
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proscribed use was indeed part of the owner’s title, there was
no such contract limitation. It is not true that no recovery is
available “because the contract did not give a right to
recovery.”201 No contract-based recovery is available despite the
fact that contract terms gave a right to recovery.202 Instead,
the government trumped the plaintiff’s contract rights. A
takings claim should be just as available here as where the
government abrogates any other right.
Fourth, barring a takings claim would create a similar
(though converse) asymmetry, a pro-government “Heads I win,
tails I lose. . . but don’t need to accept the consequences.” If a
private party’s actions render her own performance to the
government impossible, she presumably owes the government
damages.203 Yet, if the government’s actions render its own
performance to the private party impossible, it would owe
nothing. That may be fine as a matter of contract law—the
very essence of the sovereign acts doctrine—but the plaintiffs
should be able to show that the sovereign act created a taking.
To bar pursuit of a takings claim creates an asymmetric
playing field.
Fifth and finally, to bar a possible takings claim in the
sovereign acts context would also violate the oft-repeated rule
that the takings concept has “limited application” where rights
are voluntarily created by contract.204 Barring a claim in the
breach-but-sovereign-acts defense scenario would functionally
change “limited application” to “no application.”

their right to use the decreed water rights.” Kobobel v. State Dept. of Nat. Res., 249
P.3d 1127, 1132 (Colo. 2011).
201. Cf. Home Savings of America, F.S.B. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 487, 495–96
(2002).
202. At least the contract might have given a right to recovery. In Klamath II and
Casitas I, the court decided that sovereign acts defense applied without determining
whether the contract had actually been breached. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United
States, 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 752–55 (2006); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75
Fed. Cl. 677, 682 (2007).
203. Carabetta Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (explaining the general rule from contract law that a contracting party cannot
discharge its contract duties where the party’s own actions made contract performance
impossible).
204. See, e.g., St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Baggett
Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sun Oil Co. v.
United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978); J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411
F.2d 1246, 1249 (Ct. Cl. 1969).

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012

33

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

158 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:1

Thus, in the breach-but-sovereign-acts defense scenario, a
plaintiff should be allowed to assert a takings claim.205 This
was the result the Federal Circuit allowed in Casitas III. The
panel determined that the government, employing its
sovereign powers, went beyond what the contract allowed it to
do when it diverted the water, thus breaching the terms of the
contract.206 But it also determined that the government had a
valid sovereign acts defense.207 The panel then proceeded to
address the merits of the taking claims.208 That has to be the
correct approach. It does not, of course, mean the plaintiff will
prove a taking, but she should at least be able to have her
takings claim considered.
C.

The Complexities of the Water Arena

This article’s thesis, that the answer to whether government
action involving a property interest created by contract with
the government can lead to a takings claim in addition to a
contract claim should turn on why the contract claims fails,
received significant treatment earlier this year. In Century
Exploration New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, the trial court
agreed that a lack of breach shows nothing has been taken
from plaintiffs and recognized that such reasoning does not
apply where the government breaches the contract yet
successfully invokes the sovereign acts shield.209 The court,
however, found itself bound to Stockton East III,210 which, as
discussed above, allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on a takings

205. Accord Garden, supra note 141, at 205 (noting that if the government defends a
breach claim by asserting a sovereign acts defense, it “has laid the groundwork for a
later takings claim should the court agree that the sovereign acts defense applies”).
206. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas III), 543 F.3d 1276, 1286–87
(Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
207. Id. at 1288.
208. The trial court determined that a regulatory, not physical taking, analysis was
the correct one to apply, and concluded there was no taking. See Casitas Mun. Water
Dist. v. United States (Casitas II), 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007). The Circuit reversed,
finding that the per se taking analysis applied. Casitas III, 543 F.3d at 1296. The
applicability of the physical versus regulatory talking analysis is beyond the scope of
this article.
209. Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 70, 81
(2012).
210. Id. at 83. Because this article discusses two earlier Stockton East decisions, it
employs “Stockton East III” to describe what Century Exploration references as
“Stockton East II.”
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claim even where the plaintiff lost its breach of contract claim
on the merits (i.e. no sovereign acts defense).
Yet Stockton East III was itself bound by precedent. It could
not overrule a previous precedential decision, absent an en
banc or Supreme Court decision.211 Only a year before Stockton
East III, in St. Christopher Associates v. United States, the
Federal Circuit denied the breach of contract claim on its
merits yet dismissed the takings claim, holding that “any claim
that St. Christopher may have asserted should be a breach of
contract claim.”212 St. Christopher’s dismissal of the takings
claim in a case where it had just denied recovery on the
contract claim presents the same factual scenario as the two
pertinent years in Stockton East. Stockton East III’s
characterization of St. Christopher’s dismissal of the takings
claim as a “passing comment”213 is incorrect; it was the holding
of the case.214 St. Christopher is entitled to at least as much
precedential weight as Stockton East III on this question.215
Further, St. Christopher was not a departure. Before St.
Christopher, in Castle v. United States the plaintiffs were not
awarded any contract damages for the government’s alleged
breach of contract, yet the Circuit agreed that because
plaintiffs retained the full range of contract remedies, there
could not be a taking.216 And before Castle, in Baggett
Transportation Company v. United States the plaintiffs with a
government contract lost on their contracts claim and

211. Hernandez-Garcia v. Nicholson, 485 F.3d 651, 653 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
212. St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
213. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2009), on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
214. St. Christopher Assocs., 511 F.3d at 1385. In the paragraphs that followed its
holding that the takings claim was unavailable, St. Christopher, went on to analyze
whether, “even if we were to conclude that St. Christopher could pursue a claim
outside the contract,” plaintiff had stated a taking claim. Id. It found plaintiff had not.
Id. at 1385–86. That alternative analysis does not diminish the holding.
215. See also Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 724, 738 (2008), aff’d, 550
F.3d 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2008). After denying plaintiff’s contract claim, the court dismissed
plaintiff’s takings claim without reaching the merits because the property rights
underlying the takings claim did not “exist independently of their contracts” and in
such a scenario the “proper remedy for infringement lies in contract, not taking.” Id. at
724. The Circuit affirmed.
216. Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Because the
panel determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to any contract damages even if
there was a breach, the court declined to reach the issue of whether there had been a
breach at all. Id. at 1341.
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attempted to bring a takings claim.217 The Federal Circuit
rejected the claim as “merely a reformulation of the carriers’
argument, which we rejected” in dismissing the contracts
claim, and it summarily dismissed the takings claim.218
Moreover, the most prominent case discussing the “limited
application” rule was Sun Oil Company v. United States.219
While Sun Oil did use the “limited application” language in the
context of a plaintiff prevailing on a portion of the contract
claim seeking additional recovery through a takings claim,220
Sun Oil itself pointed to J.J. Henry Company v. United States
as the source of the “limited application” rule.221 J.J. Henry
had announced a decade earlier that the Takings Clause “has
limited application to the relative rights in property of parties
litigant which have been voluntarily created by contract.”222
Crucially, in J.J. Henry the plaintiff lost the contract claim, yet
the court still dismissed the takings claim.223 The “limited
application” language in J.J. Henry had nothing to do with
barring additional recovery by a successful contract claimant.
The rule does not apply only to winning contract claimants.
Reading the “limited application” doctrine as simply a rule
barring takings compensation on top of contract damages is
not only inaccurate as a matter of precedent, it creates a
redundancy. There is already an ample rule against double
recovery. As the Court has observed, it “goes without saying
that the courts can and should preclude double recovery.”224
Allowing a plaintiff to recover twice for the same injury would
already produce a “manifest error of law,”225 quite apart from
any special takings/contract interplay. There would have been
no need in any of the cited cases for a scholarly analysis of the
relationship between the Takings Clause and contract rights if
all that needed to be said was, “Of course, a plaintiff cannot
recover twice for the same injury.”
Instead, the “limited application” language makes perfect
217. Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1033–34 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
218. Id. at 1034.
219. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
220. Id. at 820.
221. Id. (citing J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1246 (Ct. Cl. 1969)).
222. J.J. Henry, 411 F.2d at 1249.
223. Id. at 1255.
224. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 261 (2002).
225. Duran v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 653 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2011).
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sense if it means the following. First, the Takings Clause has
no place where rights are created by contract and the
government either breaches (or does not breach) the contract,
according to the terms of the contract. Second, the Takings
Clause must apply in that minority of cases where the
government breaches the terms of the contract yet is able to
escape liability by arguing that its breach was immunized by
the sovereign acts doctrine. That breach-but-sovereign-actsdefense scenario is a restricted but occasional scenario that fits
the definition of “limited.”226
The above analysis applies even where a plaintiff in contract
or privity of contract with the government elects to bring only
a takings claim and avoids a contract claim. Where a plaintiff
alleges that government action or inaction relating to its
contract with plaintiff worked as a taking, the plaintiff does
not state a takings claim even if she decides not to plead
breach of contract.227 If a takings claim is “at bottom, a simple
action for breach of contract” and there is no showing that the
government would refuse a contract remedy, should the
plaintiff prove a breach, the plaintiff does not state a takings
claim even where she chooses not to pursue the contract
claim.228 Because the government has not impaired plaintiff’s
ability to enforce the rights secured by contract, a plaintiff is
“free to pursue whatever remedy” her contract allows and “[n]o
taking lies.”229
More generally, as the Federal Circuit notes, where a claim
“stems from a breach of contract, the cause of action is
ultimately one arising in contract.”230 A plaintiff may not,
through “crafty pleading,” style a breach of contract claim as
something else.231 A court should “not permit plaintiff to
pursue a takings remedy in order to circumvent the limitations
inherent in its contractual relationship with the
Government.”232 That statement is consistent with the Court’s
226. THE MIRRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2005) (defining limited as
“confined within limits; restricted”).
227. Griffin Broadband Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 320, 322–25
(2007).
228. Casey v. Depetrillo, 697 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 1983).
229. Griffin Broadband, 79 Fed. Cl. at 324.
230. Awad v. United States, 301 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
231. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2008).
232. Cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 299, 303 (2003) (finding no
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recent warning in a takings case against “a mere pleading
rule”; the focus, instead, must be on the “operative facts and
not whatever remedies an aggrieved party might later
request.”233
But applying the above principles to water cases involves
another wrinkle. First, the “limited application” the Takings
Clause discussed above is only for parties in contract (or in
privity of contract with) the government. Privity of contract is
a threshold requirement for a contract claim; if a claimant is
not in privity of contract, he or she can (indeed, can only)
proceed under a takings theory.234 There may be some water
rights holders in a given dispute who enjoy no privity. For
example, under the contract in Orff v. United States, the Ninth
Circuit determined that only the water district (and not the
farmers who used the water) could assert a breach of contract
claim.235 If certain water users have no privity of contract with
the government on which to base a contract claim, the above
analysis does not apply; the Takings Clause might be the only
avenue to seek a remedy.236
Second, and significantly more complicating, the “limited

additional damages available).
233. United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 1728–31 (2011).
Tohono is instructive in another respect; even the dissent had no qualms finding a
plaintiff barred from pursuing a takings claim when the plaintiff simply lost the other
claim on the merits; the dissent’s concern was barring a takings claim where the
plaintiff was “unable” to obtain relief because the other claim could not have been
adjudicated. Id. at 1738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). That seems consistent with this
article’s thesis that a plaintiff simply losing a contract claim on the merits does not
state a takings claim, while a plaintiff barred by the sovereign acts doctrine from
pursuing her contract remedies does.
234. Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (finding that
for those plaintiffs not in privity of contract, a contract claim was not available and a
takings claim was the correct avenue).
235. Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d on other
grounds, 545 U.S. 596 (2005). The Court rested its affirmance on the lack of a
sovereign immunity waiver for the district court to entertain such claims; the Court
implied that had the farmers pursued their claims in the correct court (the United
States Court of Federal Claims), they might have had a contract claim. Id. at 601–02
n.2. Under the contracts in Klamath, the trial and appellate courts agreed that the
water users had contract claims. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath
I), 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 534 (2005); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV),
635 F.3d 505, 510 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
236. Cf. Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 532. See also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 46 (1960) (findings plaintiffs not a party to pertinent contract could pursue takings
claim).
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application” the Takings Clause has to cases involving parties
in contract with the government applies only where rights are
“voluntarily created by contract.”237 That does not unduly
bedevil a case like Century Exploration, where, after some
preliminary wrangling the court could fairly easily determine
that the only property interest in question was the right
voluntarily created by the contract (lease) with the
government; there were no rights in play existing
independently of the contract.238 It is not so simple in the
water rights context.
Klamath provides a taste of the complexity. Klamath I
explained that there were five different categories of
contractual agreements with the United States, including
property interests that pre-existed the project but may have
been exchanged later for project water, and the reverse,
interests derived from project contracts that may have later
become something else.239 Klamath III addressed the interplay
between the contractual agreements and the plaintiffs’
property interests in the water, but could not “provide a
definitive answer.”240 Two judges in Klamath IV believed that
plaintiffs had a cognizable property interest for purposes of a
takings claim, though such interests might have been
eliminated by contractual agreements with the government,241
while the concurring judge was more absolute, believing that
the initial creation of that water right was itself contingent
upon the agreements.242 And if that was not enough
complexity, the government’s potential infringement of a water
contract may very well have impacted other, non-water rights
a plaintiff separately holds. For example, if the government
cuts off water, a plaintiff may claim that the government took
not only a state water right but also her land and
237. See, e.g., Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1034 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978), which in
turn borrowed the language from J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1246, 1249
(Ct. Cl. 1969)).
238. Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 70, 80
(2012).
239. Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 530–31.
240. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath III), 227 P.3d 1145, 1165–
66 (Ore. 2010).
241. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath IV), 635 F.3d 505, 519 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
242. Id. at 524 (Gajarsa, J., concurring in judgment).
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improvements, for instance by rendering a farm and farming
improvements “essentially useless” without the water.243
It is not entirely clear how the courts will or should handle
the “created by contract” angle in the water cases. In St.
Christopher Associates v. United States, plaintiff attempted to
frame as a takings claim its initial assertion that the
government breached the contract (involving a low interest
loan) by failing to consider plaintiff’s rent increase request,
reasoning that the result of the government’s failure was a
decreased rate of return and a deteriorating apartment
building, a building which was undoubtedly plaintiff’s separate
property.244 The Federal Circuit rejected the assertion that a
takings claim was available; a contract claim (in that case, a
losing contract claim) was the only available avenue.245 As
Franconia Associates v. United States phrased it, a takings
claim is unavailable even where the breached contract affects
not only the contract right but results in a “substantial
devaluation” or even “total loss” of the plaintiff’s other property
existing independent of the contract (in that case also an
apartment building).246 Franconia’s conclusion turned on the
nature of the power (proprietary v. sovereign) the government
invoked “rather than the nature of the [plaintiff’s] property
itself.”247
Under this reasoning, it would not matter for purposes of
this analysis whether a plaintiff had a contract with the
government to receive water, took that contract water, put it to
beneficial use, and obtained some certificate or patent or,
conversely, that the plaintiff had a previously-existing water
right she later exchanged for a contract right to receive water
under certain terms. If the government breached the contract
terms, the impact of that breach on plaintiff or plaintiff’s other
property may or may not be recoverable as a matter of contract
damages.248 But if a contract remedy does not produce a

243. Kobobel v. State Dept. of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1133 (Colo. 2011).
244. St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
245. Id.
246. Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 718, 739–40 (2004).
247. Id.
248. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 766, 779 (2006) (if
government’s breach created reasonably foreseeable costs, these “may be fully
vindicated through a breach of contract”). Cf. Shelly Ross Saxer, Managing Water
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particular recovery, it is because the contract (and contract
law) does not give a right to that recovery.249 The case law
discussed above is consistent that a plaintiff winning on a
contract claim cannot (via a takings claim) seek compensation
unavailable as a matter of contract damages.250
Conversely, if the government did not breach the pertinent
contract—if, for example, a contract includes a shortage clause
immunizing the government under certain conditions, and a
court finds that an environmental restriction qualified as a
condition that excused the government from full performance
and precluded contract liability251—that would end the takings
matter as well. The contract terms would be an inherent
limitation in plaintiff’s property right, the government would
have acted in its proprietary capacity, and the plaintiff would
retain her full range of contract remedies, all precluding a
takings claim. “[I]rrigators claiming interests based upon their
contracts with the districts cannot possibly have rights to
water that exceed the limitations found in the contracts
between those districts and the United States.”252 As the
Federal Circuit noted elsewhere, “[i]f the terms of the
easement when first granted are broad enough” to encompass
the government’s action, the plaintiff “would not be in a

Rights Using Fishing Right as a Model, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 96–97 (2011) (“Courts should
allow recovery under contract law for government breaches, but water districts and
other water users should not be allowed to make takings claims by asserting that
water usage promised in a contract constitutes a property right, subject to a
governmental taking.”). The extent of allowable contract damages are beyond the
scope of this article.
249. Home Savings of America, F.S.B. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 487, 495–96
(2002).
250. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that it could seek takings relief in addition to a
contract claim because interest was not allowed on contract damages). Even Stockton
East III only allowed the takings claim to proceed for those years where the contract
claim failed, not those years where the contract claim succeeded. Stockton East Water
District v. United States (Stockton East III), 583 F.3d 1344, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
on reh’g, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See also Detroit Edison Co. v. United States, 56
Fed. Cl. 299, 303 (2003) (“If plaintiff succeeds on its breach claim, the court will award
only the damages contemplated by the [contract at issue] and will not permit plaintiff
to pursue a takings remedy in order to circumvent the limitations inherent in its
contractual relationship with the Government.”)
251. See, e.g., O’Neil v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681–87 (9th Cir. 1995), discussed
supra notes 56–61.
252. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath I), 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 535
(2005).
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position to complain” of a taking.253 The government would not
be responsible for the effect exercising its rights as a
contracting party had on another party’s other property
interests.254 Unless the plaintiff could point to some other
“intervening sovereign act,” something beyond the act taken by
the government pursuant to its contracting authority, no
takings claim would be available.255
But a strong argument is not an ironclad, impervious one. In
another apartment rental dispute, the plaintiff claimed that
the government preventing its loan repayment resulted in her
apartment being “conscripted” as low-income housing beyond
the terms of the initial contract, and the court allowed the
takings claim to proceed.256 In the scenario where the
government allegedly breached its contractual obligations to
remove spent nuclear fuel from plaintiffs’ facilities, leaving
plaintiffs to house the waste product and leading to takings
claims that the government appropriated a portion of (or all)
plaintiffs’ facilities, the courts have been mixed on whether to
dismiss the takings claims because they were precluded by the
contract claims, dismiss the takings claims on other grounds,
or actually allow the takings claims to proceed.257 And while
the court in the Tamerlane v. United States case cited above
dismissed plaintiff’s takings claim without reaching the
merits, it did so because the property rights underlying the
takings claim did not “exist independently of their
contracts,”258 which begs the question of what it means, in the

253. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the
scope of an easement).
254. In some sense, this scenario is the opposite of the one in Palmyra Pacific
Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States, 561 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Palmyra argued that
the government’s prohibition on commercial fishing in surrounding waters adversely
affected the value of its contract right to engage in activities on shore. Id. at 1366. The
result was the same—no taking—but Palmyra involved a restriction on an (asserted)
non-contract right impacting a contract right, not a restriction on a contract right
impacting a non-contract right. Id. at 1367.
255. Textainer Equip. Mgmt. Ltd. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011).
256. Henry Housing Ltd. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 250, 254 (2010).
257. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–
17 (2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ physical and regulatory takings claims, but on other
grounds); Canal Electric Co. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 650, 655-56 (2005) (no
takings claim allowed, only contract claim); Detroit Edison Co. v. United States, 56
Fed. Cl. 299, 303 (2003) (allowing takings claim to proceed as an “alternative theory”).
258. Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 724, 738 (2008), aff’d, 550 F.3d
1135 (Fed. Cir. 2008), supra notes 162, 215.
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convoluted water arena, for a right to exist “independently” of
the contract. Thus, the intersection of the contract and takings
claims in the water rights context may be more difficult to sort
out than in the typical scenario.
IV. CONCLUSION
For rights created by contract with the government, the
answer to the question of whether a takings claim is available
should hinge on why or how the government successfully
defends the contract claim. As noted above, the courts agree
that where rights are the product of a voluntary contract with
the government, it is acceptable to postpone consideration of
the takings claim until the contract claim is resolved.259 The
proper rationale for doing so would be that advanced by one of
the plaintiffs in Century Exploration: the court should not
dismiss the takings claim before determining whether the
government acted in a proprietary or a sovereign capacity and
should allow plaintiffs to proceed with their takings claim in
the event that the court dismisses the contract claim based a
sovereign acts defense.260
Such a sequence would lead to one of three conclusions. If
the government breached the contract, that is the end; the
plaintiff is entitled to whatever damages contract law allows,
but the plaintiff cannot recover on a takings theory even if that

259. If the plaintiff does not bring a breach-of-contract claim regarding government
action or inaction related to the contract, and brings only a takings claim, the court
would dismiss that takings claim for failure to state a claim, although presumably if
the plaintiff timely re-filed a complaint urging contract and takings claims, the court
could then postpone consideration of the takings count. Cf. Griffin, 79 Fed. Cl. at 322,
325.
260. Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 70, 75, 80
(2012). The court phrased the argument as whether the contract claim was barred
under “an affirmative defense such as the sovereign acts defense.” Id. There are many
affirmative defenses, such as the common law right of “setoff,” Nwogu v. United
States, 94 Fed. Cl. 637, 662 (2010), that are just as available to private contracting
parties as to the government. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 525,
534 (9th Cir. 2011) (listing several private-party affirmative defense to a breach of
contract claim). The government asserting such a generally-available affirmative
defense would not alter the analysis. Nwogu, 94 Fed. Cl. at 661–62. The discussion
here is about the government asserting a sovereign acts defense that no private party
could assert. Another example would be sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48–49 (1960) (allowing takings claim to proceed where the
government took an action “which no private [party] could have done” yet was not, via
sovereign immunity, subject to suit).
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would yield greater recovery.261 If the government acted within
its rights and responsibilities under the contract and did not
breach the contract, that is also the end; there is no takings
claim, for plaintiff retained her contract remedies. The
government was only doing what the contract allowed it to do,
and plaintiff had no right to more.262 Conversely, if the
government breached the contract but successfully asserts a
“sovereign acts” affirmative defense,263 there is no contract
liability but the court should proceed to determine whether
that sovereign act caused a taking. Such an approach would
bring some much needed consistency to the takings and
government contracts world.

261. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (finding that plaintiff’s could not pursue takings claim on top of successful
breach of contract claim, even though takings claim would have allowed pre-judgment
interest that breach did not).
262. St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
263. The sovereign acts defense is an affirmative one. Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v.
Geren, 550 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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